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Equality and diversity
Chandran Kukathas
Australian Defence Force Academy, University of New South Wales, Australia
abstract The foundations of human inequality lie in the fact of human diversity, or in
the human tendency to differentiate from some while associating with others
to form groups. The diversity which results from association and
differentiation makes equality unattainable. Diversity and equality are
incompatible, and attempts to promote one can only be made at the expense
of the other. In these circumstances, we should abandon the ideal of equality
as incapable of offering us an adequate understanding of the nature of the
good society.
keywords diversity, equality, property, Rousseau, culture
Equality in the most general sense means a condition of being the same, in terms of 
possessing quantitatively assessable attributes. Inequality, on the other hand, suggests
a want of equality and a diversity among comparable entities.
V. Kubálková and A.A. Cruickshank1
In a world that has become proximate and more intimate, and which is characterized by
a massive political awakening, inequality is becoming less tolerable.
Z. Brzezinski2
Prologue
The first men who, having enclosed themselves within a staked boundary,
bethought themselves of saying ‘We are one’, and found people simple enough
to believe them, were the real founders of political society. From how many
crimes, wars, and murders, from how many horrors and misfortunes might not
any one have saved mankind by pulling up the stakes and crying to his fellows:
‘Beware of listening to these impostors; you are undone if you once forget that
we differ hardly at all, and the earth itself recognizes differences among nobody’.
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But there is great probability that things had then already come to such a pitch,
that they could no longer continue as they were; for the idea of difference
depends on many prior ideas, which could only be acquired successively, and
cannot have been formed all at once in the human mind. Mankind must have
made very considerable progress, and acquired considerable knowledge and
industry which it must also have transmitted and increased from age to age,
before it arrived at this last point. Let us then go deeper, and endeavour to unify
under a single point of view that slow succession of events and discoveries in the
most natural order.
I
According to Rousseau, the inequality which now prevails in human society
owes its strength and growth to the development of human faculties, and became
permanent and legitimate with the establishment of property and laws.3 It is the
argument of this essay, however, that the foundations of inequality lie less in
property than in human diversity, or in the human tendency to differentiate from
some while associating with others to form groups.4 The diversity which results
from association and differentiation makes equality unattainable. Diversity and
equality are incompatible, and attempts to promote one can only be made at the
expense of the other. In these circumstances, we should abandon the ideal of
equality as incapable of offering us an adequate understanding of the nature of
the good society.
The essay is organized in the following way. In section II, which follows, I try
to show why diversity poses a problem for equality, and why the pursuit of 
equality can only come at the cost of the suppression of diversity. I shall further
argue that we should abandon equality as an aim because the suppression of
diversity brings with it problems of its own, and, in the end, does not bring about
equality, but simply creates different inequalities.
Section III then turns to consider an objection to this argument. This is the
objection that not all forms of equality are susceptible to this critique. More 
particularly, the desirable and attainable form of equality is equality between
diverse groups, rather than equality among all individuals within and across 
different groups. Indeed, this objection goes, equality requires the strengthening
of groups by granting them special rights. Against this view I argue that it not
only constitutes a weakening of the egalitarian ambition, but also a more serious
assault on diversity than is recognized.
Section IV considers a different objection. This is the argument that, while
equality might compromise diversity, this is not a serious concern. At worst,
there may be a small reduction in diversity; but this is more than compensated for
by the securing of equality. Against this view I argue that equality requires a
more serious compromising of diversity than this objection suggests.
Section V concludes with some remarks about the moral significance of diver-
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sity, and why equality is of lesser importance. It ends with some speculations
about the prospects for diversity at a time when inequality is becoming less 
tolerable.
II
Any effort to deal with the issue of equality must begin by asking the question:
‘Equality of what?’ Human beings can be equal or unequal in a myriad of 
ways; but egalitarians, while they have defended different kinds (or bundles) of
equality (or equalities), have been attracted to a much smaller number. They have
not, typically, been interested in equalizing beauty,5 or in equalizing happiness
(or misery).6 But they have been interested in other equalities: in equality before
the law; in equality of status; in equality of wealth or of income or resources or
capabilities; in equality of welfare or of opportunity for welfare; and in political
equality. Some egalitarians have argued that simple equality does not capture
their commitments, and have offered theories of ‘complex equality’. Michael
Walzer, for example, has argued for a pluralist conception of equality in which
different principles of distribution apply in different ‘spheres of justice’,7 while
John Baker, in maintaining that equality is ‘a complicated idea’, has defended
principles of equality which include principles of satisfaction of basic needs,
equal respect, economic equality, political equality, and sexual, racial, ethnic,
and religious equality.8
But there is another question which is no less important than ‘Equality of
what?’, and that is the question: ‘Equality of whom?’ This question is important
because the scope of any principle(s) of equality is not self-evident. Principles 
of equality might be held to apply to all of humanity; or they might be thought
applicable only to those members of a particular political society; or they might
be restricted further still to apply only to free, adult, citizen males in a society
(and not to cover those who are slaves, children, foreigners or women).9 Egali-
tarians differ on this issue: some think equality should be pursued primarily with-
in one’s own society (though many argue that this would also provide the basis
for moving toward greater global equality); others, however, think that there is a
more immediate and direct obligation to include all of humanity in the pursuit of
certain forms of equality.
This question of the scope of equality is important not only when egalitarians
are faced with the challenge to extend their principles beyond national bound-
aries. It is also important within a single political community. The reason for this
is that political societies are frequently made up of many different groups or
communities. So the question of the scope of equality is a question about who is
equal not only because individuals can be equal or unequal, but also because
groups can be equal or unequal. A society which upholds equality might thus be
equal in many different ways. It may be that the different groups in the society
are equal because they are equally wealthy, or equally powerful; or it may be that
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all individuals in the society are equally wealthy, even though there are inequali-
ties of status and political power among the different groups; or it may be that 
the groups in society are equally wealthy and powerful, but there are significant
variations between groups inasmuch as some distribute wealth and power among
their members much more equally than others.
In view of the variations which are possible (as indicated in the matrix in
Figure 1) in any society marked by a diversity of groups, it is important to ask
what is the scope of any proposed principle of equality. The pursuit of equality
between groups but not individuals would yield a regime of equality of inegali-
tarian groups (cell 2); while the pursuit of equality among individuals but not
between groups would yield a regime of inequality of egalitarian groups (cell 3).
The successful pursuit of equality among individuals and between groups would
yield complete equality (cell 1); but indifference to equality would most likely
yield general inequality (cell 4), though not complete inequality, since there may
be some egalitarian groups within the society.
Individual equality Individual inequality
1 2
Intergroup equality Complete equality Equality of 
inegalitarian groups
3 4
Intergroup inequality Inequality of General inequalities
egalitarian groups
Figure 1
Given these alternatives, the first thing that has to be said is that complete 
equality is almost unattainable in any society marked by diversity. This is not
because perfect equality is unattainable; egalitarians have seldom, if ever, argued
for perfect equality, since they have readily conceded that, even if it could be
established, it would quickly be ended by people’s behaviour. If there were per-
fect equality of wealth, this would change the moment some decided to consume
their portion, others to save, and yet others to engage in trade — not to mention
those who decide to die, or chance to be born. (Perfect equality of status would
end as soon as someone was admired; and perfect equality of power would 
end as soon as someone was given responsibility.) Nor is the argument here 
that complete equality is strictly unattainable for sociological reasons: because
hierarchies are inevitable, and dominant powers will defend their privileges
(though there is much truth in this). Egalitarians readily reply that this is an
aspect of the inequality they are combating, but maintain that the fight is worth
fighting, even though the odds are against the elimination of all privilege.10
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The reason complete equality is almost unattainable in a society marked by
diversity is that people in such a society come attached to groups. Complete
equality is attained only if there is equality among individuals in society and
equality between groups. Yet if there are even small differences between groups,
it becomes difficult to maintain both individual equality and group equality.
Imagine, for example, a society made up of two groups, one of which has 100
members (the Minnows) and the other of which has 1000 members (the Pikes).
If the equality in question is equality of wealth, and the desirable distribution is
individual equality, the Minnows should have 100 units of wealth and the Pikes
1000. If, however, the desideratum is group equality, each group should receive
550 units of the available 1100 units of wealth — though this would make each
Minnow 10 times wealthier than any Pike. Simple numerical diversity is enough
to cause this problem in principle. In the complexity of the real world, however,
it is even easier to find instances of this problem.11
For example, the use of preferential policies to address inequalities of oppor-
tunity between groups may work to increase equalities between the general 
level of benefits enjoyed by particular groups as wholes, but at the expense of
equality between individuals in society. Favoured individuals in poor groups may
thus grow wealthy, making for wider differences not only between them and the
poor of the richer groups, but also differences between them and the poor of their
own, poor group. Thus, the richest Aborigines in Australia are richer than most
Australians, and richer still when compared with most Aborigines, even though
Aborigines as a group are among the poorest communities in the country.
Similarly, in Malaysia, the preferential policies which benefit the Malays have
raised the general level of Malay wealth, but have also helped to make some
Malays millionaires — and many times wealthier than fellow citizens of Malay,
as well as of Indian and Chinese, descent.
The impact of difference on equality emerges as even greater when the extent
of diversity in society is brought into focus. Leaving aside differences stemming
from attachments to institutions or professions or neighbourhoods, a society such
as the USA includes Mormons, Hutterites, African Americans, Pueblo Indians,
Amish, Hasidim, Muslims, and Californians, to name just a handful of the dis-
tinctive groups to be found in that country. Even without taking into account the
divisions within many of these groups, the problem facing anyone looking to
bring about greater equality is that these groups are not all equally well disposed
toward or interested in equality. Many of these groups exist as separate com-
munities with their own particular cultural standards and moral concerns.
Some groups are highly egalitarian. The Kung San people of southern Africa
(according to John Baker) live in highly egalitarian communities, not only
because inequalities of wealth are small,12 but also because there is greater 
equality of status than is common elsewhere.13 Hutterite society is similarly 
egalitarian, in large part because individual private property is not a feature of
their social structure. Among other groups, however, there may be significant
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inequalities of wealth and income, but no correlation of income with status. A
Brahmin, particularly in rural India, may be poor (indeed, much poorer than a
wealthy man of lower caste) but have much higher status.
In a society in which this kind of diversity prevails, general equality (whether
of status, or income, or wealth) becomes problematic. There are several reasons
for this. For one thing, some of these groups may simply be uninterested in 
equality (or, perhaps, be uninterested in some inequalities) within their com-
munities. Mormon societies, for example, may be quite indifferent to inequalities
of wealth, but very conscious of equality when it comes to community service.
Other groups, however, may be quite conscious of intra-group inequalities, but
indifferent to the disparities between the wealth or status of their members and
that of outsiders. The Amish, for example, who reject the pursuit of material
wealth and are wary of its corrupting effects, are undismayed by the affluence of
other Americans. Nor are they much concerned by political inequality, since they
want no part of life outside of their own communities. Yet other groups may be
uninterested in equality because they are ignorant of ways of life beyond the
community. The Indians of Brazil or the Orang Asli (or aboriginal people) of
Malaysia, lacking any conception of life in the modern world, have no desire to
embrace it, and are often the unwilling victims of attempts to bring them into it.14
Even if they were interested in equality, however, some groups might prefer (or
have no choice but) to endure inequality because they are not prepared to pay the
price of equality, since that choice may require a compromise of a particular way
of life. The Aborigines of North Queensland who rejected the proposal for the
establishment of a mine by the Century Zinc company did so, not because the
A$60 million compensation was inadequate, but because they decided that they
would rather forgo the money than have their cultural environment disrupted,
even though their condition was one of considerable poverty by most standards.15
(On the other hand, people from some groups are prepared to put up with great
inequality in order to leave the community. Immigrants, typically, suffer a dra-
matic drop in living standards, particularly when they move to very different
societies, since human capital is not always readily transportable. A scientist in
Vietnam or a doctor in Afghanistan may find himself starting at the bottom as an
immigrant, working as a waiter in Sydney or driving taxis in New York.)
In some cases, however, a group may be interested in becoming more equal
with the other groups in society, but be hampered by its very nature or ‘cultural
structure’. Even if the Amish were interested in acquiring greater wealth, the
horse and plough driven with enthusiasm are not going to generate great sur-
pluses. Or at least, none to compare with the product of modern agribusiness.
Even if technological innovations are employed, a community’s social organiza-
tion may not accept the division of labour which is necessary for productive and
profitable management techniques. Worker participation and collective decision-
making may bring many satisfactions, but wealth is unlikely to be among them.
There are, in fact, numerous groups whose various ways make the prospect of
politics, philosophy & economics 1(2)
190
their becoming equal decidedly remote. This is because these groups display a
diversity of attitudes to wealth (what it is and how it is distributed), to status, to
income, to choice, to opportunity, and generally to well-being. Diversity (or,
more specifically, differentiation) is, quite simply, an obstacle to equality.
The question then becomes: should diversity be repudiated, if it is the basis of
inequality? A full answer to this question would require an account not only of
the value of diversity, but also of the value of equality.16 For the moment, how-
ever, I wish only to argue against the rejection of diversity and, so, against
enforced equality. The most important reason for not repudiating diversity is that
it is so fundamental a feature of the human condition that any serious attempt to
suppress it will lead to injustice and the disruption of individual lives. This is not
to say that diversity does not have its downside. Differentiation is the basis of
conflict; and group differentiation is the basis of group conflict. Nonetheless, the
tendency to differentiate and to form groups is so deeply ingrained in human 
conduct that it is ineradicable.
Why do people form or join or remain in different groups? According to John
Harsanyi, human conduct is governed by two primary motives: economic gain
and social acceptance. If so, one of the motives for group membership is eco-
nomic. An undifferentiated society made up only of individuals who are not also
members of different sets is a difficult society in which to operate — unless it is
a very small society. If individuals are not distinguished into groups, the cost to
others of informing themselves of the nature and conduct (and probable inten-
tions) of those individuals goes up, as does, consequently, the cost of transacting
business with those individuals. Equally, given the different standpoints which
might plausibly be taken on a variety of questions, ranging from personal affec-
tions to aesthetic tastes to moral judgements, it is unsurprising that individuals
should seek to economize by adopting packages which come with group mem-
bership. Those who find themselves (whether by birth or by choice) in a particu-
lar group would find it costly to leave even if they disagreed with it on one 
particular matter, if only because they may be in agreement with much else. The
cost of finding another group which endorses the right package may be very high.
In this, as in so much else, individuals will adopt a satisficing17 strategy, opting
for membership in groups which endorse a package of beliefs and practices they
can accept, even if it is not one which maximizes their utilities. A social structure
dominated by group membership thus has the advantages of minimizing infor-
mation, and so transaction, costs through the supply of standards of conduct.
Groups also make a difference to the extent that they are jealous of their 
reputations. This again contributes to the ease of operation in the society for 
individuals in so far as it supplies information about individual conduct which
would otherwise be costly to obtain.
The appropriate literature to draw upon here is the literature of transaction cost
economics. The central explanatory hypothesis of transaction cost economics is
that ‘governance structures having lower transaction costs will be adopted, other
Kukathas: Equality and diversity
191
things being equal’.18 The key issue for transaction cost economics is the choice
between market exchange and hierarchy. In this literature, ‘market exchange’
means a transaction between two independent owners of assets, while ‘hierarchy’
(the alternative to market exchange) is an arrangement whereby one agent takes
over ownership of all relevant assets and supervises the activities of the other
party.19 Market exchange is most likely when bargaining costs are small (for
example, if assets are short-lived), but hierarchical distortion would be large
(effort is costly to monitor or management costs are high). Hierarchy is more
likely, however, when bargaining costs are high, but hierarchical control is 
easily achieved.20
In a world of large numbers of individuals, but without groups, bargaining
costs would be high. There are three kinds of bargaining costs. The first is the
cost imposed by coordination failure, which might arise when individuals adopt
several different patterns of mutually consistent, self-interested behaviour, 
but markets fail to ensure coordination. A second kind of bargaining cost is 
measurement cost: the cost of calculating the benefits of exchange. A third source
of bargaining cost, and perhaps the most important, is the cost of information
about the preferences of other parties.21 In the circumstances of high bargaining
costs, it would make sense for individuals to associate in groups, or for rootless
individuals to join groups. For groups resolve for the individual the coordination
problems which would confront him as an isolated actor in an undifferentiated
market by enabling him to economize on information, to overcome the problems
posed by his ignorance.
The benefits of this membership remain even if the individual who joins a
group has to enter a subordinate position in a hierarchical structure. There are
several reasons why a person might be willing to enter into a form of association
in an inferior position. One is that the worst outcome of entering such an associ-
ation is good enough to make it worthwhile. Another, however, is that the 
persons or the association to which the individual is subordinate often has a 
reputation to protect or enhance, a reputation which turns on how it exercises
authority. If that authority is exercised so badly that it is to the disadvantage of
the subordinate individual, it may prompt flight from that association.22 Thus,
even an individual in a weak or subordinate position may have enough power,
given the structure of incentives when reputation matters, to secure good treat-
ment.
The cost of information and the value of reputation go a long way to explain-
ing why humans enter, and prefer to deal with associations or groups. We can see
this, for example, in the success of the most recognizable fast-food outlets
(McDonald’s, Pizza Hut, KFC, and so on) which depend upon their reputation for
providing standardized items reliably. Particularly in conditions of uncertainty,
or when search costs are high, people prefer chains, even when there are to be
found high-quality, non-standard restaurants offering variety and atmosphere.23
The same reasoning holds in the world more generally. The cost of examining
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and deciding every case on its merits is too high for individuals not to break off
into smaller cooperative units. The diversity of such units or groups, however,
reflects the variety of human circumstances as well as the differences among
individuals in perception and risk aversion. Given such differences, the human
condition must be one of cultural and moral as well as of economic and organi-
zational variety. Transaction costs give rise not only to the firm, but also to 
societies.24
With this diversity comes inequality. The reason, however, is not, as Rousseau
suggested, that the division of labour makes humans interdependent and brings
about property.25 It is, rather, that, between groups or societies there will be
inequality because different practices will produce different outcomes: some
groups will be larger than others, some will grow wealthier, and some will 
simply die. Over time, minor differences may be amplified, as ‘path dependence’
leads groups or societies in different directions, and to different levels of pros-
perity.26 The very interaction of people with one another, and their capacity 
for ‘tracking a complex flow of action’, as well as ‘responding appropriately
within such a flow’, produces diversity;27 and this sets societies and cultures on
different paths.
Within some societies there will be inequality only because it is unlikely that
they will all adopt some egalitarian social arrangements, and even less likely that
they will all be egalitarian in all respects. Even though anthropological evidence
reveals egalitarianism within traditional Aboriginal societies of Australia (which
were characterized by ‘anarchy, free access to natural resources, [and] egalitarian
mutuality’28), it also reveals important dimensions of inequality. Between clans
and bands there was equality since the clans were not stratified and owed no 
allegiance to a sovereign.29 Within the groups, however, there were important
differences between the three ‘estates’: men, women, and novices or youths.
Between older and younger men there was sexual inequality; between men and
women there was religious inequality.30
In this particular case, property is neither a cause nor a concomitant of in-
equality (since Aboriginal society was characterized by free access to natural
resources). This suggests, most obviously, that the connection Rousseau draws
between property and inequality is not a necessary one. Inequality is quite possi-
ble without property, indeed, without metallurgy and agriculture. But this also
reveals that in a diversity of societies, there is no reason to think that a single type
of property will emerge. Ownership might emerge in some societies in ‘fee 
simple’ property; in others as rights of usufruct; in some as collective properties;
and probably in most as a mixture of all of these, and perhaps some other forms
of property as well. In such circumstances, inequality of wealth or income will
be evident not only because of differing levels of entitlements, but also because
of different kinds of entitlements.
In the Kirene village of Senegal (before 1972), for example, an account of the
social structure would reveal quite a complex system of property and equality (or
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inequality). While property and wealth could be accumulated, much of this
reverted to the collective upon the death of the owners. As a result, while there
were often considerable differences in current real living standards, income 
differences were transient, tending to be dispersed through inheritance patterns.
The absence of a monetized economy also had a significant bearing on this 
feature of the society.31
In the face of this kind of diversity, the pursuit of complete equality is an
implausible undertaking. Even to attempt to accomplish equality among indi-
viduals would require (forcibly) overriding the practices and institutions of a
variety of groups. The reason this overriding must take place if equality is to be
put into effect is in part that many of these practices are the sources of inequality.
But there is a deeper reason that the pursuit of equality requires the overriding of
practice. In order to conceive of equality across a variety of forms, a common
denominator or metric must also be conceived. The diversity of ways and of 
values must be brought under a single measure so that when benefits and burdens
are to be redistributed equally there is a metric by which the distribution can be
judged.
This point is seen very clearly by Ronald Dworkin in his justly famous paper,
‘Equality of Resources’. Dworkin points out that ‘an equal division of resources
presupposes an economic market of some form, mainly as an analytical device
but also, to a certain extent, as an actual political institution’.32 In the argument
that follows, Dworkin shows that, if there is a vast variety of goods and services
in society, there must be a device for setting prices. Markets are needed to set
prices. In setting up his own case for an equal distribution of resources, he needs
a way of establishing, if not the worth, at least the price of all the possible goods
and services available for distribution. This leads him to construct the imaginary
auction that is at the heart of his theory, and which forms the basis for his egali-
tarianism. ‘Equality of resources supposes that the resources devoted to each 
person’s life should be equal. That goal needs a metric.’ And, he adds: ‘The 
auction proposes what the envy test in fact assumes, that the true measure of the
social resources devoted to the life of one person is fixed by asking how impor-
tant, in fact, that resource is for others’.33
The problem is that, in a society marked by a diversity of ways, the very idea
of such a metric makes no sense. In communities such as those of the Kirene, or
of traditional Australian Aboriginal society, for example, the marketized value of
the ‘resources’ they have in their possession may not be encompassed by their
understandings of the worth of these ‘resources’. Century Zinc, the Australian
government, and the majority of non-Aboriginal Australians might see in the
lands off the Gulf of Carpenteria several hundred million dollars of export earn-
ings, while the owners see only sacred sites and homelands. The egalitarian must,
if he is as clear-sighted as Dworkin, insist that these lands be viewed as social
resources whose value is established by market mechanisms which determine
how important those resources are for others. Yet there is surely a problem here.
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There is a problem, most obviously, when a small group is in possession of a
resource which has great ‘market value’, but which has no such value to the
group because it is a non-market society or one which is only partly integrated
into market society. If equality demands a more equal distribution, either that
resource would have to be liquidated and redistributed, or the owners would 
have to be taxed and any surplus over and above their fair (and equal) share re-
distributed. Yet if the owners are a non-market society, they may not be able to
pay the relevant taxes without selling, so only the first option may be feasible.
The problem here is not that this is unjust. Whether it is depends on the theory of
justice invoked. The problem is that some ways of life are governed by different
norms of social justice, not only because the distributions of benefits and burdens
within the community are governed by different standards from those of the
wider society (or other communities), nor simply because equality is differently
valued, but because understandings of what things may properly be made the
objects of distribution differ quite radically. Not everything can be reduced to a
monetary value.
Now, two objections may be raised against this example. The first is that it is
misleading because Aboriginals tend to be the most seriously disadvantaged in
society, so the idea that they should give up their sacred lands is naturally seen
as outrageous. Yet the principle of equality of resources would never require that
since, even with economically valuable sacred lands, they would still be below
the average in the overall resource holdings. This objection evades the point. The
problem arises only (and precisely) in those cases where Aborigines would be
above average if their lands were sold (or if the market value of the land were
used to determine the level of their resource holdings).
The second objection, however, is that the Aborigines have no case if their
lands really are that valuable. The whole point of the theory of equality of
resources is to say that people should be aware of, and take into consideration,
the costs of their preferences for the lives of others. The Aborigines should con-
sider the fact that their resources may be vitally important for the lives of others.34
This argument is a powerful one. But it depends on an assertion which may be
questionable from the Aboriginal point of view — that justice is substantially
(even if not wholly) about the (equal) distribution of resources whose value is
calculated in monetary terms.35 For them, not everything may properly fall with-
in the scope of a distributive calculus: lands, sacred objects, and bodies may be
regarded as inappropriate for consideration as resources. Such a view would, of
course, be at odds with a view of justice which took everything as a legitimate
candidate for distributive calculation, such as the Rawlsian view that even 
bodily assets and talents have to be put into the common pool (even if only
notionally). The point here is not that this view is wrong, but simply that it runs
up against those views found in some other traditions which uphold different
understandings of justice. The pursuit of equality, in such circumstances, can
only be served by subordinating or disallowing those other understandings.
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In the end, for the group in question the objection to the use of any equalizing
metric to evaluate (or reorder) their society may be that it violates internal stan-
dards by which the group lives (which may well be egalitarian standards which
utilize a different egalitarian metric) and that go unrecognized by the outside
world. Even if those standards are inegalitarian, however, there may be a prob-
lem of justice in attempting to judge a community by standards it does not accept,
or even recognize.36 To the outside world, Hutterite society, for example, may
appear to be a ‘rampant dystopia’, riddled with ‘structural violence’, while to the
Hutterites there may be ‘a high degree of structural and cultural harmony present
that symbolically maps reality through all aspects of Hutterite life, a life charac-
terized by strict orthodoxy, discipline and uncompromised communal living’.37
An equalizing metric may have no moral relevance to Hutterite society. This
problem cannot be resolved by adopting a different metric, or by offering a dif-
ferent answer to the question, ‘Equality of what?’ Amartya Sen, in his extensive
writings on equality and inequality, as well as in his work on the standard of 
living, poverty and hunger, suggests that what matters for human well-being, and
the freedom to pursue well-being, is the distribution not of Dworkinian
‘resources’, or Rawlsian ‘primary goods’, but of ‘capabilities’.38
The well-being of a person, according to Sen, is a matter of that person’s
achievements, understood as a vector of his ‘functionings’ (or ‘beings and do-
ings’). The relevant functionings can vary from such things as being adequately
nourished, or in good health, to being happy, having self-respect, and taking part
in the life of the community. ‘The claim is that functionings are constitutive of a
person’s being, and an evaluation of well-being has to take the form of an assess-
ment of these constituent elements.’39 ‘Capability’ refers to the various combina-
tions of functionings that the person can achieve, and is, thus, ‘a set of vectors 
of functionings, reflecting the person’s freedom to lead one type of life or 
another’.40 The relevance of a person’s capability to his well-being arises from
two distinct, but interrelated, considerations. ‘First, if the achieved functionings
constitute a person’s well-being, then the capability to achieve functionings 
(i.e., all the alternative combinations of functionings a person can choose to have)
will constitute the person’s freedom — the real opportunities — to have well-
being.’41 Second, achieved well-being may itself depend on the capability to
function, since ‘choosing may itself be a valuable part of living, and a life of 
genuine choice with serious options may be seen to be — for that reason — 
richer’.42 The critical feature of Sen’s theory is that the capability approach
emphasizes the importance of freedom to pursue well-being, and regards this
freedom not simply as an instrument, but also as a constituent of well-being, in
so far as deciding and choosing are also parts of living.
Yet, while Sen is surely right to argue that his idea of ‘capabilities’ offers a far
more plausible candidate for the object of equalization than do the alternatives he
rejects, it does not get around the problem posed by the diversity of subjects of
equality. For one thing, some societies or communities depend for their con-
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tinued existence upon inequalities of capability. The traditional Aboriginal 
society described earlier supplies an instructive example. First, in this society,
capability is not important to the extent that, within the society, there is little (if
any) sense that activity is chosen or that choice renders activity valuable. In part
this is because this is a society in which the course of cultural development has
limited the number of ‘serious options’. But, in fact, the idea of choosing among
options (in any but the most trivial sense) is quite alien. In this society, conform-
ity is second nature, for the religious traditions, manifested in and perpetuated by
the complementary cults of Aboriginal men and women, inculcate a doctrine of
the structural and historical unity of society and nature, thus shaping individual
character by repressing waywardness and intractability.43 Sen’s concept of 
capability presupposes an appreciation of individuality which is entirely absent
in Aboriginal society.
Second, even if the notion of capability could plausibly be employed in this
context, equality of capability could not, for while the traditional Aboriginal 
society in question is egalitarian with regard to material goods, it is deeply 
inegalitarian in matters pertaining to religion — matters which, in this society,
are of far greater importance. While both men and women perform rites from
which the other sex is excluded, the cult life of women is held in low regard 
ritually. The men’s cults, despite their secret core, require the active participation
of the community at large. In this culture, as Maddock explains, ‘Women belong
to society, but matters of vital concern to society do not belong to women; the
paradox so created calls for rationalization and this is given dramatically in rites
and epically in myths of enforced ignorance’.44 But this inequality is further 
reinforced by the social structure, in which women are at an early age drawn into
marriage (to older men) and child-bearing and domestic labour, while boys at 
the same age are drawn into the religious life, competence in which is crucial in
manhood, but excluded from domestic life and sexual activity.
Any pursuit of equality of capabilities would have to transform such a society.
Any attempt to transform it, however, would create two related problems. First,
there is the problem of the dislocation members of this society would suffer 
if equalization of capability were attempted. Second, this would bring about 
inequality between individuals in this community and members of the wider 
society in so far as the context in which they had capabilities no longer existed.
The point here is not simply that equality should not be enforced upon unwilling
beneficiaries; many egalitarians accept this. The point is, rather, that equality,
even in its most sophisticated variants (such as that of Sen), runs aground on the
rocks of diversity. And, this is even without considering the difficulties posed by
the fact that, for some people, the good of their group matters more than the 
good of individuals. Sen’s capability argument ignores the possibility of people’s 
interest in (or preference for) equality of group capacity, rather than equality of
individual capability.
At bottom, the problem for the egalitarian, who wants to view the good society
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as one which reflects the equality of people who can only be found scattered
across a diversity of communities or societies, is that people differ in ways which
make equality unattainable. Most significantly, they differ in the ways, and
extents to which, they value individual well-being. Some societies or communi-
ties or cultures value it little, or not at all. In this regard, it will always be a 
mistake to talk about equality of individual resources, or individual capabilities.
This is not to suggest that value is to be located elsewhere than in individual lives
or that something matters more than (or rather than) how individual lives go.45 It
is, however, to warn against what Ernest Gellner, referring to ethnomethodology,
called ‘the Californian way of subjectivity’: a form of inappropriately individual-
istic thinking.46 It is a mistake to think that because what matters ultimately is
how individual lives go there should also be a standard by which we might judge
whether or how far all individual lives are going equally well.
This point is worth making also because there has been no shortage of attempts
to transform society by seeking out standards along which people might be equal-
ized, or their lives standardized. The history of ‘modernization’ in the Third
World is in good part the story of governmental efforts to bring order into the
chaotic world of diversity by imposing standards by which differences can be
measured, and deviations monitored. As James Scott observes, the ‘functionary 
of any large organization actually “sees” the human activity of interest to him
largely through the simplified approximations of documents and statistics: for
example, tax proceeds, lists of taxpayers, land records, average income,
unemployment numbers, mortality rates, trade productivity figures, the cases of
cholera in a certain district’. And these typifications are indispensable to state-
craft.47 Yet if we hope to be sensitive to the different ways in which human beings,
in their various communities and associations and traditions, see the world, and
pursue the good life, we should be wary of efforts to establish uniform standards
of evaluation.48
Diversity, it would seem, presents a serious problem for equality. The exist-
ence of diversity is not only inescapable, but also reflective of the fact that 
people pursue the good life collectively, but in different ways, not all of which
value equality in the same way, or at all. If diversity is to be accepted, then equal-
ity must be abandoned. It must be abandoned as a practical goal because its 
pursuit demands a serious disruption of the lives of peoples who view equality
differently or who value equality differently. It must equally be abandoned as a
philosophical idea to the extent that it is a task of political philosophy to describe
the nature of the good society. For, if a good society is marked by the kind of
diversity I have suggested, equality has no role to play in describing it.
Yet, egalitarians will undoubtedly disagree. Even if they concede that com-
plete equality is unattainable, they might still argue that this is to misunderstand
equality, and that there are other, more plausible or coherent forms of the egali-
tarian idea which are consistent with diversity. So let us turn to consider some of
these arguments.
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III
In the preceding section, I argued against the plausibility of complete equality,
suggesting, first, that individual equality and group equality were incompatible;
and, second, that the diversity of groups made it unlikely that a society of differ-
ent egalitarian groups was achievable. This argument effectively ruled out cells
1 and 3 in the matrix presented in Figure 1, as possible candidates for a plausible
theory of equality. It remains, therefore, to consider the option presented in cell
2: equality of inegalitarian groups. The argument of this standpoint is much more
sensitive to the fact of human diversity, and is also cognizant of the fact that indi-
viduals are attached to groups. It seeks not simple equality between individuals
of different groups, but equality among groups. In its most sophisticated variants,
this view suggests that it is only through an appreciation of the diversity and the
moral importance of groups that we can, in fact, achieve any worthwhile kind of
equality among individuals. Nonetheless, this ideal is an implausible one; for,
once again, the fact of diversity proves to be an obstacle to equality.
Viewing the matter in the most simple terms suggests some obvious problems
for the pursuit of equality between groups. Perhaps the most obvious is the 
problem posed by differences in size. In any political society, small groups are
usually going to be politically and economically weaker as groups. This is not
inevitable, since there are too many cases of minorities ruling the majority: in
South Africa under apartheid, in post-independence Burundi and Rwanda, and in
post-independence Malaya (when Malays were still a minority of the population,
and the poorest of the ethnic communities). Nevertheless, in most countries, the
groups which are significantly smaller than others are usually much the weaker
politically, and often poorer as groups. Often, this is due simply to the fact that
small groups, even of wealthy individuals, cannot compete with large groups of
poorer ones, since the large group needs to demand only a small sacrifice from
each individual to gather significant political resources. In democratic societies,
in which votes are a political resource, group size is even more important.
But other aspects of the nature of the group can also tell against any hope of
equality of the group with others in society. Some groups, by their traditions,
shun political involvement and so give up any hope of political equality. The
Amish do not seek subsidies for their way of life; but for the exemptions they
seek they can draw on few political resources. They do not generally vote, and
never stand for public offices: thus, they have little political capital. Other
groups, however, may be politically weak for different reasons. The Pueblo
Indians, for example, are politically weak to the extent that, politically, the
Pueblos have never been united, and each village or pueblo is an independent
unit. While the All-Pueblo Council is (according to the Pueblo) the oldest inter-
tribal organization in the USA (formed during the Pueblo Revolt against the
Spanish in 1680), it has had only a sporadic existence. This is because when there
are no common problems ‘the Pueblos cherish the autonomous character of their
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home communities and respect the independence of other pueblos’.49 Conse-
quently, the All-Pueblo Council has never emerged as an essential, or as a viable,
organization for the Pueblo, who do not cooperate politically, even though they
cooperate freely in ceremonial life.
Indeed, sometimes groups may be weak politically because they are internally
diverse. Again among the Pueblo, for example, there is considerable linguistic
diversity (with some of the languages being mutually unintelligible) as well as
diversity of political, social, and ceremonial organization.50 This internal diver-
sity goes a long way toward explaining why the Pueblo have united on only two
occasions in their long history: once in 1680, and then again in the 1920s to
defeat a bill threatening to give free title to non-Pueblo squatters on Pueblo land.
Sometimes the politically debilitating effects of group diversity are exacer-
bated by the fact that the group is geographically dispersed and small in number.
This is clearly the case with the Australian Aborigines, who comprise less than 
2 percent of the Australian population, are divided into different groups, speak
different languages, and are spread over a continent almost the size of the USA.
Among the most important obstacles to political unity has been the internal diver-
sity of the group; and an important reason for this internal diversity has been the
geographical separation of the group, which has given its different members a
wide variety of customs and traditions, as well as historical experiences — not
the least important of which were their varying experiences of contact with the
Europeans.
The insular nature of many groups (and, indeed, subgroups) introduces another
difficulty for any attempt to bring about greater equality among groups. Group
membership, in producing this insularity, often brings about an indifference of
members to people of other groups. In this regard, even when groups have tradi-
tions or practices which have strong egalitarian dimensions, these often reflect a
concern with intragroup equality, but not intergroup equality. Robert Frank’s
study of the importance of status in human conduct brings this out very clearly.
Human beings, he suggests, care less about their relative standing within the
world, or even within the society, than about their standing among their peers, or
within the relevant group of which they are members.51 They do not mind
inequality with outsiders in bigger ponds, provided they can find equality, even
if not higher status, in their own ponds. If this is indeed so, then one danger of
the pursuit of intergroup equality is that it may lead to intragroup inequality, and
so to the destabilizing of the group. This is most likely to happen to the extent
that intergroup equality is achieved through cooperation with the elites within the
group. Commonly, the benefits gained by the group are most easily accessible by
the elites, who also come to have more in common with other elites than with
members of their own community. This creates resentment within the group,
whose members become conscious of the inequalities which emerge within their
ranks.52 Yet this is virtually unavoidable in the pursuit of intergroup equality.
Given the insurmountable nature of these obstacles to simple forms of equal-
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ity, it is unsurprising that more sophisticated theories of equality have been
devised to press the case for equality of groups. These alternative theories are
theories arguing for equality through the recognition of group rights. Groups
might be made more equal not by measures taken to make them equal in all
respects, but, instead, through measures to eliminate certain critically important
inequalities. Thus, equality might require the granting to particular groups any of
a number of special rights, ranging from language rights, and land rights, to rights
of political representation and even self-determination. The most fully developed
theory here is that of Will Kymlicka, and the analysis and critique which follows
will focus primarily on the arguments presented in his extensive writings.
In Kymlicka’s theory, special rights should be granted to certain groups to 
correct the inequalities they suffer due to their particular circumstances. The
argument he offers is a modification of the Dworkinian theory of equality of
resources. Like Dworkin, he suggests that equality demands that individuals have
equality of resources; but, unlike Dworkin, Kymlicka believes that equality of
resources requires that special provision be made for those whose resources turn
out to be inadequate if they find themselves living as members of a minority com-
munity, perhaps even one which is scattered throughout the larger society.53
Aboriginal peoples, or ethnic or linguistic minorities, for example, might find
themselves in such a circumstance. Their unequal condition would be a reflection
of their unequal resources given the real nature of their circumstances. For they
need additional help or advantages of some kind in order to maintain the social
structure necessary to make choices, to pursue goals — to live. Equality means
rectifying unchosen inequalities.54
For this reason, equality would be served, for example, if particular groups
were granted language rights. This might, perhaps, require the government to
provide public schooling in a minority language, to avoid condemning that 
language to marginalization. More generally, it may be necessary for govern-
ments not only to recognize languages, but also to draw boundaries and distribute
powers among groups. We should, Kymlicka argues, ‘aim at ensuring that all
national groups have the opportunity to maintain themselves as a distinct culture,
if they so choose’.55 In the end, ‘group differentiated self-government rights 
compensate for unequal circumstances which put the members of minority cul-
tures at a systemic disadvantage in the cultural market-place, regardless of their
personal choices in life’.56 And in general, in so far as existing policies in a 
society support the language, culture and identity of dominant nations and ethnic
groups, Kymlicka argues, ‘there is an argument of equality for ensuring that some
attempts are made to provide similar support for minority groups, through self-
government and polyethnic rights’.57
One initial observation that has to be made about this approach is that it is a
fairly modest approach to the question of equality in so far as it does not seek
more than a basis for redressing cases of unfairness or disadvantage in society.
Yet if this theory is viewed as a theory of equality, the problem from an egali-
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tarian point of view is that it is too modest, since it can deliver very little equal-
ity. The first objection it is open to is the standard objection mounted against the
idea of equality of opportunity: that it means, in the end, equality of opportunity
to become unequal. In this case, the equivalent objection is mounted against the
idea of giving certain minority groups the help needed to maintain the social
structure necessary for their members to make choices. But what this still means
is that, in the end, some groups will survive and others will die, since nothing
which leaves individuals free to abandon the group can ensure that it will endure.
There is no way of ensuring equality of survival chances, for some will not 
survive. More serious attempts to ensure equality of opportunity for survival,
however, run the risk of intruding into the lives of groups (by restricting mem-
bers to activities which do not threaten group stability).
Yet even if we lower our expectations further, the special rights approach will
not deliver very much equality. The granting of language rights, for example, is
a case in point. Even if governments take steps to ensure that minorities can 
preserve their languages, there are limits to the benefits this can bring. Small
groups are simply going to be disadvantaged to the extent that their numbers 
cannot support the variety of activities in which people engage without going
beyond the linguistic group. There may not be enough people to supply the 
writers, newspaper editors, television journalists, radio-show hosts, and teachers
in the vernacular to sustain the language. In the modern world, the division of
labour is not equally hospitable to all forms of diversity.
To the extent that language policy does succeed in allowing some groups to see
their languages in use, however, it will not do so equally. Larger linguistic groups
will have the advantage over smaller ones; and policies aiming at linguistic
equality may benefit large minorities at the expense of small ones. For example,
in a society in which three languages are spoken, one (say English) may be 
dominant or nearly universally spoken, another (say French) may be spoken by a
significant minority, primarily in a particular region, and a third may be spoken
by a small minority. Linguistic ‘equality’ may, in fact, impose the heaviest 
burden on the smallest minority. The English speakers may be able to get away
with learning only one language, as may the French; but the smallest minority,
especially if it is located within the French region, may have to learn two or 
three languages if it is to survive. It may be better off if there were only one other
dominant language to learn, since that would leave the members with more
resources to devote to preserving their own. (My argument here, it should be
stressed, is not an argument against policies accommodating linguistic diversity;
it is only an argument to suggest that they may not serve equality.)
This problem points to a more general difficulty with the idea of pursuing
equality by awarding special rights to groups. Groups often contain subgroups,
which may coexist in an uneasy unity that remains stable because the different
subgroups have enough of a common interest to keep their differences buried.
Special rights aimed at bringing about equality, however, may accentuate divi-
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sions and so generate new group inequalities, this time between what were once
subgroups. In Australia, for example, the making available of resources for
migrants (who endure inequalities resulting from their conditions as new arrivals)
quickly generated conflicts among the major ethnic communities over the 
distribution of the resources. With important rents to be gained, conflicts were
sometimes bitter and generally disruptive of previously harmonious community
organizations. Discord aside, however, it also happened that the larger and more
resourceful ethnic organizations benefited disproportionately.
A similar story can be told about the experience of the Salish community, who
were given special fishing rights which should have made them more equal with
the rest of society. Yet, the effect of the rights was to accentuate already existing
inequalities within Salish society between marine and riparian fisher folk, and,
ultimately, to divide the community.58
The fact that groups are often made up of smaller subunits points to another
important feature of groups which poses a problem for the pursuit of equality:
groups are fluid. This is to say that they change their character — often in 
response to economic and political circumstances. Groups are not just cultural
entities; they are also political and economic ones. To the extent that the promo-
tion of equality alters the political and economic environment, it can also affect
the nature of the group. For example, a policy aimed at promoting equality by
offering special university places to Aborigines will not only offer an incentive for
Aborigines to enter higher education, but will also offer an incentive for those
wanting a higher education to regard themselves as Aborigines. One does not
have to imagine any far-fetched scenarios59 to see that this is possible. People of
mixed descent have often abandoned one possible identity by identifying with
only one strand of their ancestry,60 but they might be led to reinvent themselves by
emphasizing the other strand in order to reap the benefits available. The effect of
this may be to increase the degree of equality between groups, but at the expense
of diluting the identity of the group being equalized upwards.61 This is a problem
which has faced Native American groups which have prospered through their
gambling casino earnings in states in which their reservations have a monopoly on
gaming. The profits enable the group to acquire the resources needed to preserve
the culture; but the culture is diluted not only by the source of income, but also by
the increase in numbers wishing to declare themselves descendants of the tribal
group.
On the other hand, a very different, though no less troubling, consequence
might ensue from the pursuit of group equality, this time stemming from the 
fact that some people may not wish to preserve their designated identities.
Immigrants, for example, sometimes wish not to reassert their original identities,
but to assimilate into the host society. Policies of group equality, which offer 
special rights to groups to enable them to maintain their distinctiveness can 
also serve to exclude and to marginalize the newcomers. Ramesh Thakur, for
example, has argued against the Canadian ideal of the ‘mosaic’ (as compared
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with the American model of society as a ‘melting pot’), suggesting that it is one
which demeans those immigrants who wish to assimilate and not live out their
days as ‘expatriates’. ‘By being officially hostile to assimilation, Canada forces
newcomers to be expatriates rather than immigrants. The mosaic becomes a 
subtle policy instrument in the hands of “true blood” Canadians for maintaining
their distance from the new pretenders.’62
The problem for the pursuit of group equality, in the end, is posed by the fact
of diversity. Diversity is too complex for group equality to be reached without
significantly altering the structure of diversity. Indeed, most of the time it is too
complex for us to be aware of the differences which exist — or to understand
which differences matter. To pursue equality, it is necessary to know what 
different things, or bundles of things, are to be equalized. The problem is that
there is no obvious way of demarcating boundaries or identifying bundles. People
see diversity differently. An interior decorator who buys books by the pound 
may see diversity in colours of his hundred-weight of tomes; but a scholar or a
bibliophile will see their diversity very differently (or simply find all the books
equally worthless). It is, of course, possible to establish authorities who will
determine which are the relevant diversities (and so the relevant equalities which
should be pursued). But it is not clear that such a move, while perhaps politically
necessary, should be invested with any particular moral significance.
In the human world, the problem began when people started to draw bound-
aries separating one group from another. Once this was done, equality became
impossible. The pursuit of equality can operate to change the boundaries; but it
will not eliminate them; nor will it eliminate, or necessarily even reduce, inequal-
ities. At best, it will simply create different ones.
IV
Against all this it might be argued, however, that while it is true that the pursuit
of equality requires compromising diversity, this is not nearly so serious a 
concern as is implied. Certainly, it is true that policies which are motivated by a
concern to address inequality will change the structure of a diverse society; but
this is true of any social policy, whether it is motivated by egalitarianism or 
not. If this is so, there is no reason to be particularly troubled by the problems
created by the pursuit of equality. What, after all, is the alternative?
The alternative is a position which Will Kymlicka has identified as one of
‘benign neglect’.63 It is also a position he has vigorously criticized as ‘not only
mistaken, but actually incoherent’.64 The idea of responding to cultural differ-
ences with ‘benign neglect’, he says, makes no sense:
Government decisions on languages, internal boundaries, public holidays, and state
symbols unavoidably involve recognizing, accommodating, and supporting the needs
and identities of particular ethnic and national groups. The state unavoidably promotes
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certain cultural identities, and thereby disadvantages others. Once we recognize this, we
need to rethink the justice of minority rights claims.65
At the heart of Kymlicka’s objection to ‘benign neglect’ is the observation that
governments cannot avoid having an influence, and the implication that the
‘benign neglect’ view fails to appreciate this. The government ‘cannot avoid
deciding which societal cultures will be supported’ (and, thus, ‘if it supports the
majority culture, by using the majority’s language in schools and public agencies,
it cannot refuse official recognition to minority languages on the ground that this
violates “the separation of state and ethnicity”’).66 Indeed, ‘the state cannot help
but give at least partial establishment to a culture when it decides which language
is to be used in public schooling, or in the provision of state services’.67
In the end, the whole idea of ‘benign neglect’, in Kymlicka’s estimation,
reflects a shallow understanding of the relationship between states and nations.
‘In the areas of official languages, political boundaries, and the division of 
powers, there is no way to avoid supporting this or that societal culture, or decid-
ing which groups will form a majority in political units that control culture-
affecting decisions regarding language, education, and immigration.’68 ‘Benign
neglect’ is not neutral with respect to ethnic and national groups; and, in ignor-
ing the fact that members of a national minority face a disadvantage which the
members of the majority do not face, it is hardly benign.69
But this critique rests on a misunderstanding. The fact that some particular 
outcomes will result regardless of whether a policy of intervention or neglect 
is employed does not make non-intervention incoherent. It is in no way an
‘embarrassment’ for the ‘benign neglect’ view that, in the absence of any delib-
erate decision to support one culture or another, one culture dominates, or some
language prevails. Some group, or some culture or some language, will dominate;
nothing can plausibly prevent this. The ‘benign neglect’ view is marked not by a
failure to realize that neglect will have consequences, but only by a willingness
to accept the consequences of neglect. This position may prove controversial, but
it is not incoherent.
The question, therefore, is whether the benign neglect view is defensible. To
answer this, it is necessary to offer a clearer account of benign neglect. Plainly,
it cannot amount simply to non-intervention in the sense of no authority doing
anything — after all, in any concrete case, political and legal institutions and
authorities may already be implicated. (Often, the problem is to work out how the
authority in question should extricate itself from involvement. For example, a
government may own lands which Aborigines claim to have been stolen.) Benign
neglect, I suggest, amounts essentially to a refusal to be guided by the goal of
equality in social policy or institutional design.
This wariness of pursuing equality stems not from the desire for neutrality, but
from the thought that the goal is unattainable — indeed, it is not even capable of
a coherent description. Equality along any one dimension can only be sustained
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at the expense of inequality along another. More importantly, the pursuit of
equality along some preferred dimension can only be sustained by employing a
high level of coercive power, given that different groups see equality differ-
ently.70 Benign neglect is preferred because, historically, intervention has not
usually proven benign. The modern state, in particular, has usually tried, through
its officials, to create a population with precisely those standardized characteris-
tics which will be easier to monitor, count, assess and manage. ‘It invariably
seeks to reduce the chaotic, disorderly, constantly changing social reality beneath
it to something more closely resembling the administrative grid of its observa-
tions.’71 Viewing society through any particular egalitarian lens will simply
reveal in the diversity of human arrangements countless inequalities which could
never be redressed without serious disruption to the lives and livelihoods of
numerous groups and individuals.
V
It might appear from the argument of this paper that the view being defended here
is to say that, in the end, diversity is what is morally valuable, and that equality
is of no particular value. But that is not quite the case. Although I do not think
that equality has any intrinsic value, I do not wish to suggest that diversity is in
itself of any particular value either. The moral significance of diversity lies in the
fact of its preponderance: the world of human societies is diverse, and reflects a
variety of ways of viewing and evaluating that world. It would not matter much
if the world did not exhibit such diversity; and in some ways, it would be better
if it did not, since differences, and the boundaries and divisions they create, are
the cause of dissension and conflict. But given that this diversity is original, it 
is wisest not to try to bring order to it via the pursuit of equality. As Hume sug-
gested, any authority exercised toward that end can only be exerted ‘with great
partialities’, and ‘who can possibly be possessed of it, in such a situation as is
here supposed?’
It should also be made clear, however, that this conclusion does not imply a
complete scepticism about value. Uninterestedness in equality need not mean
indifference to other moral questions concerning matters of justice, or poverty or
freedom. It only means viewing equality as, ultimately, irrelevant to these
issues.72 Yet whether or not it is morally relevant, equality has become more 
significant politically. If Brzezinski is right, and inequality is becoming less 
tolerable because the world is becoming more proximate and intimate, this 
may reflect the prescience of Weber’s analysis of the rationalization of modern
society. The coming (or the growing) of the demand for equality may be a reflec-
tion of the standardization of global discourse and the centralization of political
authority, which is a part of the disenchantment of the world. In these circum-
stances, egalitarian concerns cannot be ignored.
What then should be the response to the demand for equality in circumstances
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of diversity? (‘What, then, is to be done? Must we destroy society, abolish us and
them and go back to living in the forests with the bears?’) Since the pursuit of
equality is implausible, and the idea of equality gives us little help in under-
standing or plausibly describing the good society, the best we can do is to play
the game: to act as if the pursuit of equality was a meaningful endeavour, and as
if our efforts to do justice, or address poverty or defend freedom, were truly
informed by egalitarian sentiments.
What then can we say of those who adopt this attitude? Only that:
They will respect the sacred bonds of their respective communities; they will love their
fellow-citizens, and serve them with all their might; they will scrupulously obey the
laws, and all those who make or administer them; they will particularly honour those
wise and good princes, who find means of preventing, curing, or even palliating all
these evils and abuses, by which we are constantly threatened; they will animate the
zeal of their deserving rulers, by showing them, without flattery or fear, the importance
of their office and the severity of their duty. But they will not therefore have less con-
tempt for a constitution that cannot support itself without the aid of so many splendid
characters, much oftener wished for than found; and from which, notwithstanding all
their pains and solicitude, there always arise more real calamities than even apparent
advantages.
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